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
***Army Declass/Release Instructions on File* Declassification/Release Instructions
on File**

FOREWORD

The Joint OACSI-TAGO National Archives Project, referred to as Project Declassify, is an ACSI effort to declassify Retired Army Intelligence documents of the WW II and pre-WW II time frame. The project might be thought of as a small part of the larger declassification program resulting from the joint efforts by officials of the National Archives and Records Service and historical officials of the Department of Defense and The Department of State to declassify World War II documents. Included in Project Declassify are some documents dated as recently as 1949. While The Adjutant General is responsible for the declassification of retired Army files, responsibility for the declassification of the 6000 feet of Army Intelligence records rests with ACSI in conjunction with TAGO under the provisions of AR 380-5. This collection of intelligence records is located in the National Archives Building and at Suitland, Md., under the custody and control of the Archivist of the United States.

This project began in April of 1971 as a result of the growing emphasis throughout the Government on the spirit of the Freedom of Information Act. It has been supported by reserve officers from the OACSI Mobilization Designation Program as well as other MOB DES personnel in the Greater Washington area. These officers, with their SI-level security clearance eligibility and their wealth of experience in all intelligence areas, are particularly well qualified to make the decision whether to declassify or not to declassify. By virtue of overlapping assignments of Reserve officers and the overall supervision of the Project Officer, a very high degree of accuracy and uniformity is achieved in declassifying these documents.

The material which follows, consisting of guidance, regulations and exhibits, is furnished to assist the individual officer to make decisions in consonance with President Nixon's direction in January 1971 that portions of Executive Order 10501 (Safeguarding Official Information In The Interest of the Defense of The United States) be reviewed in order that whenever security permitted these old documents might be made available to the public.



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1. **DEFINITIONS:** There seems to be little need to define for this select group of officers those terms with which they have been familiar for years. However, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, perhaps it would be useful to discuss two terms which are the very essence of Project Declassify.
 - A. **DECLASSIFY.** This term means to cancel the security classification of an item of classified material. It does not mean that the material may be, or will be, released without reservation to any who might ask for it. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) permits access to such records only under a number of restrictions. (See Attachment A). Thus, the decision to declassify should be based whether the document is any longer of national security interest. This review is not designed to downgrade - i.e., to change from SECRET To CONFIDENTIAL, for example--but only to declassify and, if this is not possible, to leave the document with its present classification.
 - B. **DOCUMENTS.** Any recorded information regardless of its physical form or characteristics including, but not limited to, the following: All written material, whether handwritten, printed, or typed; all painted, drawn, or engraved material; all sound or voice recordings; all printed photographs and exposed or printed film, still, or motion picture; and all reproductions of the foregoing, by whatever process reproduced.
2. **OBJECTIVES:** The objectives of Project Declassify are to:
 - A. Comply with Presidential directives
 - B. Increase the availability of valuable documents to persons who have a legitimate need for them--e.g., scholars, historians, novelists, journalists, and scientists.
 - C. Create goodwill for the Army
 - D. Provide effective intelligence training for reservist, and
 - E. Yield guidelines for future declassification of documents.
3. **SOURCES OF DOCUMENTS:** The Army Intelligence records being reviewed consist of files retired to Archives by:
 - A. War Department General and Special Staffs
 - B. U.S. Army Continental and Field Commands
 - C. Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ)
 - D. 12th Army Group Headquarters
 - E. Army Service Forces
 - F. Nuremburg War Crimes Records

In addition, certain British, Combined Allied headquarters, FBI, State Department, Air Force, Navy, CIA and other agency's records are interspersed with the above listed documents. (See Attachment E for a Glossary of abbreviations useful in identifying the source of a document.)

4. CLASSIFICATIONS: U.S. documents are classified Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, and Restricted. The classification "Restricted" is no longer authorized, and for the purpose of this review, G-2 originated documents should be considered confidential. For a listing of equivalent foreign security classifications, see Attachment B.
5. DECLASSIFICATION GUIDELINES:
 - A. General. Perhaps the flavor of the program can be derived from the verbal instructions reduced to writing in a memorandum for the Directors of Army General Staff Divisions and the Chiefs of Army Special Staff Divisions, Subject: "Policy Concerning Release of Information from Historical Documents of the Army--With Special Reference to the Events of World War II", dated 20 Nov 1947. (See Attachment C). This memorandum states, in part: "Consistent with existing binding agreements with other agencies, and Governments, the maximum downgrading of all information on military subjects will be accomplished, except only when to do so would in fact endanger the security of the Nations." Key features of this quoted portion should be noted--"consistent with existing binding agreements...", and "the maximum downgrading of all information on military subjects..." While not endangering the "Security of the Nation", certain documents ~~which are sensitive from a personal (privileged) viewpoint or which contain information that would adversely affect U.S. relations with other nations~~ should not be declassified. It is within the general framework of the above stated policy that Project Declassify functions. Based on a survey made when the project was initiated, it was determined that approximately 90% of the documents could be declassified while the remaining 10% would continue to be classified. Not every officer has the same background upon which to base his decision to declassify or not. As a general rule, where there is reasonable doubt as to the propriety of declassifying - Don't. Doubtful or borderline cases might better be left classified at this time.
 - B. Specifics & Examples. The following categories of documents should not be declassified:
 - (1) Methodology. Those documents which contain information revealing intelligence methodology still used. Note the "still used". There is no longer any national security interest involved in the knowledge that during WW II we interrogated Japanese and German inmates of internment centers located in the U.S., nor that we furnished EEL's to our MA's, nor even that we derived intelligence from

telephone taps, and censorship. Mail intercepts, censorship, etc., is protected by the Archives, under their 75 year privileged information rule.

- (2) Agents & Sources. Documents which contain the names of current U.S. intelligence agents or sources which could be currently sensitive. The rationale behind this restriction is that the person may still be alive and if the fact were to be made public that he served as an agent or was a source of intelligence, it could be considered an invasion of privacy--or, more serious still, result in harm or embarrassment to him, his family or associates. Even the assumption that the agent or source is dead is not a proper basis for declassifying.
- (3) Politically Sensitive. Documents which contain material politically sensitive to friendly states. This restriction is somewhat less definite than others, and its proper application calls for some background or experience in how governments conduct their affairs. Fortunately, this is a field in which those officers with an intelligence background are well prepared. It might be well to consider in the same category material politically sensitive to the U.S., since what might not be particularly embarrassing to another country might be to us. For example, it is common practice & presumably it is well known & accepted by all concerned that we ask our MA's and others to furnish biographical information on high-level personalities--and even some not so high--when they are coming to the U.S., or when we feel we need the information for whatever reason. But it would most certainly be embarrassing to us to have revealed the fact that we asked for, in addition to the usual biographic data, an analysis of a person's private life, his weaknesses, his character, his interest in women, etc.
- (4) Cryptologic and Technical. Documents which reveal cryptologic or technical information relating to communications, i.e. codes ciphers machines. In this category, we have some rather clear guidelines. Messages, (some may think of them as cables) encrypted prior to February 1946 should be considered for declassification solely on the information content of the messages. Messages encrypted between February 1946 and May 1960 should not be declassified pending further guidance. (See Attachment D for authority.) For our purposes, all classified messages, including those with the obsolete classification of Restricted, are to be considered as having been encrypted. Drafts of messages and those not identified by date time groups, or control or identification number are not considered "messages" in the context of the guidance. Any document, no matter what date, which concerns cryptography, communications intelligence and related matters, should not be declassified. This includes information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques,

technical material, operation, or scope of communications intelligence, cryptography and cryptographic security. It also includes information concerning special cryptographic equipment, certain special communications systems designated by the department or agency concerned, and the communications portion of cover and deception plans.

- (5) Other Agency and Foreign. Documents, irrespective of content, originated by another US Government Agency or by a foreign government, may not be declassified by ACSI personnel. This restriction has its origination in existing binding agreements with other Agencies and Government not to declassify documents originated by them without first coordinating in such action.
- (6) Missiles. Documents which discuss missiles--their manufacture, design, storage, use, effect, etc., should not be declassified.
- (7) Racial Problems. Documents which give, or purport to give an official government position concerning minorities in general should be carefully reviewed, since the subject is still sensitive. Mere quotations from news media are not in themselves sensitive. (See attachment F for guidance.)
- (8) Nuclear/Atomic & BW. Since it is unlikely that the reservist could evaluate the relative currency or sensitivity of documents of this type, they should be left with their present classification.

6. Procedure.

- A. Take from the material furnished the next numbered box to be reviewed. Quickly riffle through the documents to ascertain their general nature.
- B. Then examine each document until you are satisfied that you know what it is about, that you have the basis for arriving at a decision to declassify or not, keeping in mind the guidance and restrictions stated.
- C. You are encouraged to discuss with other members of the Group questionable or borderline cases. Often the experience or opinion of a fellow officer will assist you in making a decision. If it can be declassified, do nothing.
- D. If it should not be declassified, affix to the document one of the markers provided. Do the same for each document or, if none of the papers can be declassified, put the tab around the entire folder. On each marker, write the reason for tabbing i.e., National Security, Crypto, etc. There are also documents which do not require continued classification because of National Security as defined by Army Regulations,

however, the document does contain political and/or personal sensitive comments and inferences that by our definition is called "privileged".

- E. Where the document is in foreign language and can't be translated by Army personnel _____ then tag it for further action. In documents stapled together, be on the alert for those from other agencies and governments. If several papers are stapled together and there is one paper which may not be declassified, put the marker around just that one paper. If there are a number of such documents--i.e., those which can not be declassified, put the marker around the stapled set.
- F. In no case should the arrangement of papers in the folder, or the folders within the box be changed. When you have completed the box, insert one of the long white strips of paper in the box folded in such a way that it hangs over the label on the box. This indicates to the Archives staff that the box has been reviewed. If you end the day with a box partially finished, indicate on the strip that you want it returned to you.
- G. On the form provided, list the boxes reviewed, put your initials in the column to the left and complete each column in the form, including under the column headed "Reason" the general nature of the documents not to be declassified--if there are any such in the box. These boxes will subsequently be stamped to show the authority for the declassification action taken.
- H. Remember the act of declassification does not mean that the document will be released without any restrictions to the general public. They will be released only when requested and only in compliance with the general restriction under which NARS functions.